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BOOK REVIEWS
SAGGI Gnmmici. By Tullio Ascarelli. Milano: Dott A. Guiffre.
1949. Pp. 474.
The noted author has assembled into one large volume twelve
disquisitions of varying content and size. The first five essays
are devoted to subjects of universal jurisprudence (if I may use
this expression). The others deal with important problems of
private law, such as those monetary debts which are subject to
revaluation, indirect transactions (contrasted with simulated and,
therefore, invalid acts), questions related to the law of corpora-
tions and negotiable instruments, and a historical investigation of
the legal theories on money.
The key-note in all parts of the voluminous work-500 pages
of this Italian type of printing are the equivalent of about 800
pages in the usual size of an American law book-is comparative
law. Dr. Ascarelli loves it. Since he knows French, German, and
Latin-American law as intimately as his Italian law and is also
familiar with Anglo-American law, his position even among com-
paratists is unique. To make a comparative law study means to
compare, under the aspect of the identity of their functions, com-
pletely different institutions of foreign legal systems. One will,
therefore, agree with the author's example taken from our trust
concept. To non-Anglo-Saxon laws, the word and idea of trust
are unknown. Nevertheless, they may reach the same practical,
i. e., socio-economic, effects as a trust through the use of the follow-
ing concepts: juristic person (corporation or a foundation),1
usufruct,2 mandate and that peculiar Roman institution called
fideicommissum, and the like.
Turning to another problem, one notices that according to
Dr. Ascarelli's views, law and state are not identical. He, there-
fore, associates the rise of the idea of codification historically with
the emergence of the "state monopoly of law," "centralized"
government, and the nationalistic type of the "ideal" state. This
is an ingenious proposition, however fallacious it seems to be to
this reviewer. 'Who can dispute that the legal source of English
common law was the state acting through its courts? On the
Continent, the emergence of the modern state brought about an
identification of law with written law, an evolution which had
1. A "foundation" is constituted of assets perpetually bound to serve a certain
purpose. It is a juristic person perpetuating itself independently of any individuals.
See 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 13 (1947).
2. An excellent example for the use-in Germany, e.g.-of a "usufruct" as a
substitute for a trust is the Opel transaction, described in Uebersee Finanz Korporation
A. G. v. McGrath, 343 U.S. 205 (1952).
BOOK REVIEWS
greatly been promoted through the deductive method cultivated
by the Romanists and Canonists. Neither can the reviewer agree
with the statement that the natural-law movement of the era of
enlightenment-called guisnaturalismo by Ascarelli-contrasted a
law "based on reason" with the traditional law on one hand and
the state-created law on the other. The Austrian Civil Code is
the foremost representative of that era ;3 but, in the first place, it
is on the whole merely declaratory of the "traditional" law. In
the second place, its draftsmen adhered so strongly to the "all-
law-is-written-law" principle that they thought that unless the
Code stated expressly that analogy and natural law are subsidiary
sources for reaching a decision, judges would not be allowed to
resort to statutory analogy and natural law. Thus, an express
statement to this effect was included.'
It is understandable that historians are likely to look to a
formulation of universal tendencies, but it is the reviewer's painful
.office, petty as it may appear, now and then to qualify broad
formulations. Thus, a dissent must be filed from the author's
opinion that in the Anglo-American view, statutes call for a strict
construction; this was not true at the time of Plowden and of
Coke, and it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century
-under the impact of modern social ideas advanced by legislation
such as the emancipation of women, and measures of social policy
-that many American courts, notably the Supreme Court, came
to look with disfavor on legislation.
Dr. Ascarelli's discussion of "gaps" (59-61) relates to
spurious gaps.5 According to Dr. Ascarelli, gaps "constitute a
macroscopic [contrast to microscopic?] example of the creative
function of an interpreter" through "the necessary process of
adjusting the pre-designed law to new social demands in an un-
interrupted course of evolution."
According to the author, it is this evolutionary function for
an extra-legislational progress of law, which interpretation shares
with "equity." This approach may-supply a reason why a
polyhistor such as Dr. Ascarelli ties Gustav Radbruch's, or rather
Aristotle's concept of equity8 which underlies the concept of "the
3. Lenhoff, On Interpretative Theories; A Comparative Study in Legislation, 27
TEx. L. REv. 312, 317 (1949).
4. The Austrian Civil Code § 7 (1811) directs that where literal and logical
interpretation and even statutory analbgy are of no avail for the decision of a case,
the judge may resort to the "principles of natural justice."
5. Genuine gaps are very rare. See LE-HoFF, COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATI ON 568 ff. (1949), and Extra-Legislatonal Progress of Law: The
Place of the Judiciary in the Shaping of New Law, 28 NEBR L. Rav. 542, 565, 566 (1949).
6. Compare the quotation from RADBRLUcs, PHILOSOPHY op LAw 63, n. 91, with
the well-known formulation in AnisToTLE, NicomAcHEAN ETHIcs c. 10 § 1.
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equity of a statute,' '7 with the equity concept of Anglo-American
equity jurisprudence. However, if the two notions have anything
in common, it is certainly not to be found in the theory of sources
of law. The former deals with individual facts, the latter espouses
general ideas.
Turning then to the core of the interpretation problem-the
choice between several "logically" correct conclusions-the author
remarks that the rationalization expressed by an interpreter does
not always reflect his actual considerations. One must not forget
that Ascarelli believes that an interpreter is always "to some
extent" a legislator.
It is at this point that the author used the Aristotelian concept
of equity; he contends that the decision of a concrete case shall
"on the one hand be in harmony with precedents, and on the other
be just and equitable." In associating those two requirements, he
emphasizes that the interpreter must not decide the single case
before him by a single rule formulated only for that case. He
has to make his decision as if the case were a typical one to be
adjudged according to its typical (not its peculiar) features by
"coordinating the result with a legal principle of general charac-
ter applicable to all cases of the same type." Predictability and
reliability ("certezz,") are indispensable for every legal system.
It is for this reason that interpretation fulfills its highest function
in striving for the integrality of the legal system within which it
acts because "a legal order has to appear as a systematic whole,
devoid of contradictions."
Kelsen's pure theory of law, which "frees" the concept of law
from the natural-law idea of justice is, for Ascarelli, therefore,
"mathematics of law." M'Teritorious as Kelsen's theory seems to
him for methodological purposes, Dr. Ascarelli thinks that it
proves itself entirely insufficient insofar as it identifies the test
for "validity" of a legal norm with the social function of law,
as the problems of interpretation and application of law demon-
strate. At this point, one may differ with the author. It is true
that values, i. e., extra-legal factors might determine a choice
between several "valid" solutions each of which could easily be
reached through. the subsumption of the facts "found" under a
proper major premise. And it is true that Kelsen's "basic norm"
is not "value-charged"; but to do justice to Kelsen, one must not
overlook that he does, of course, by no means dispute the role
played in positive law, from the constitution down to a decision
of a justice of peace, by extra-legal, i. e., value-charged consid-
7. Note written to Eayston v. Studd, 2 Plowd. 459, 465; Co. LiTT. 24b.
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erations such as economic or sociological policies, ideas, and
ideologies. If this is so, the variety of juristic-logically correct
decisions among which the interpreter might choose according to
"legislative" considerations, does not run counter to Kelsenian
thoughts. One will agree with Ascarelli's cautioning against two
illusions, one of which opposes the other: The first illusion assures
that a purely legalistic solution can satisfactorily dispose of any
social problems whatsoever. The other leads into the belief that
only "extra-legal" factors are worth considering, and overlooks
the importance and efficiency of legal concepts and principles with-
out which an arbitrary will takes the place of the law in the
guidance of human conduct.
The distinguished author gives credit to the "pure theory of
law" in a passing remark, by calling our attention to the trans-
formation of non-legal notions, e. g., psychological or economical
concepts into legal ones by their incorporation into a legal norm.
"Will" as used in criminal or testamentary law has a different
meaning from the real-psychological concept of will. This is also
the case with many other concepts such as "compulsion" or
"mistake." However, is this always true? It is left to the law-
makers to incorporate non-legal concepts with their original mean-
ing. Our Immigration Act finds justification for deportation, in
inter alia, alien's "moral turpitude." Courts have, in interpreting
the two words, used "the moral code of mankind" as the criterion
for the characterization of a person's conduct, giving little, if any,
consideration to its criminal quality.
Other phases of the "transformation" problem appear in the
third chapter. It is there that the author's working method of
overwhelming the reader with detailed examples is used to the
best advantage. I am thinking particularly of the historical pro-
cess of the "transformation" of legal concepts, e. g., the juristic
structure of property or of credit. New social and economic
conditions have necessitated new orientations.
Also the reading of the pages dealing with the process through
which legal innovations adopted in other countries have been sub-
ject to a "transformation' -- giving the adopted institution a func-
tion different from that which it fulfills in the country of its origin
-seems to me extremely profitable, especially for comparatists.
Thus, despite a similar legal foundation, "shares" 9f a stock
company in France serve a different function from. shares under
the law of corporations in Brazil. Ideas of an entirely different
legal system have gained ground, interpretatively at first, but later
legislatively, as the acceptance of the trust idea and of North
American constitutional concepts in Latin-American law prove.
345
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Such a penetration is consummated through interpretation rather
than through legislation. The interpretative process uses diverse
techniques for that purpose. In countries having a codified legal
system, the so-called general clauses which an Italian writer
properly called the "windows" in the legal mansion, are a most
helpful tool. These general clauses and general terms consist of
references to immensely broad concepts, such as standards of
decency (boni mores) or requirements of good faith measured in
terms of common usages or of a way of conduct as in the circum-
stances a bonus pater familias would act.
In thinking of the various approaches through which innova-
tions might enter, Ascarelli properly includes the process of
"characterization," called "qualification" abroad. It is a process
which is required in every field of law, and is not restricted to
cases in conflict of laws. Changes in characterization have, at
times, revolutionized the law. Ascarelli refers to the canonistic
prohibition against taking interest on a loan. He remarks that
when the prohibition had become outdated since money loans were
no longer made only by the rich to the poor for the purposes of
procuring necessaries of life but were made to well-to-do or rich
men for purposes of production, such financial transactions were
no longer "characterized" as a loan (mutuum). One could add
that the change in the characterization of a work stoppage (for
higher wages), formerly regarded as "criminal conspiracy," has
become the historical fountainhead of our modern labor law.
Since space considerations limit me to treating one more
interesting comparative-law problem only, my choice is for that
of the "commercialization of civil law." Unlike Anglo-American
law, nearly all foreign legal systems-except those of the Scandi-
navian countries-have built up a commercial law which is distinct
from civil law. One cannot read Ascarelli's explanation of the
reasons for such a dichotomy without being thrilled by his compar-
ison of the role of ius praetorium (honorarium) in Roman law and
equity in English law with that of commercial law on the European
continent and the Latin-American countries. His comparison of
these developments demonstrates that the role was the same for
all three "systems"; it was that of infusing new legal theories
and principles, new standards and remedies, into the traditional
law (ius civile), common law, and private law, respectively. After
the purpose of modernizing had been fulfilled, the formerly new
ideas were absorbed by the "old" legal system. The historical
era of separation concludes with an "edictum perpetuum," or
"merger," and the replacement of separate commercial codes with
modern civil codes which adopted the leading ideas of the former.
The fusion of commercial and civil codes is found in the Swiss
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Code of Obligations and in the most recent Italian Civil Code.
The "commercialization" of these codes deprived "commercial
codes" of their raison d'etre. On the other hand, the law of Soviet
'Russia has adopted all of the important legal principles and
theories which distinguished the commercial law of the non-Anglo-
Saxon countries, although the economic structure of Soviet Russia
rests upon premises which are diametrically opposite to the
principles which had guided the emergence of commercial codes.
The desire to find striking analogies is deeply engrained in the
legal mind, but analogies are often more apparent than real.
"Equity" arose when the common law lost its creative force.
Commercial law concepts answered a need for the regulation of
particular activities in the economic sphere. By merging such
regulations in a general civil code, the latter will necessarily
become more comprehensive for it has still to deal with those
particular activities. Although the new Italian legislation no
-longer includes a Codice di cominercio, it devotes large chapters
to the law on commercial enterprises and to the entry of a "firm"
into the commercial register and partly retains the concept of a
"merchant." In its function of promotor of new ideas rather
than in its form, foreign commercial law has an interesting simi-
larity to equity. These remarks in no way detract from the great
merit of Ascarelli's keen perspective.
The book shows a depth very rarely reached in legal literature.
Students of comparative law are very fortunate in having now
united in one volume a series of articles published previously by'
Professor Ascarelli in Brazil and Italy. This origin of the book
accounts for the frequent repetition of certain ideas. The book is so
-full of good things that a new edition might be expected in the
'not too distant future. One could also wish that the new edition
be free of the-alas-misprints, particularly of proper names and
foreign words.
Arthur Len.hoff
Professor of Law
University of Buffalo
